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1 March 1960

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Copy No. C 68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO. 1
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HH 10-2
DATE: 6 JUN 1980 REVIEWER:

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State Dept. review completed

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Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000010001-4

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1 MARCH 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev, in press conference in Indonesia, again avoids directly linking signing of separate East German peace treaty to results of May summit meeting.

①

II. ASIA-AFRICA

UAR and Israeli forces apparently still on partial alert, but the concern over hostilities appears to have abated somewhat on both sides.

②

Japan--Opinion favoring retaliatory measures against South Korea growing rapidly.



③

Nehru to meet with Burmese Premier-elect U Nu in early March.

④

Cyprus negotiations progressing satisfactorily on less controversial issues but will become increasingly difficult when the size of British bases again comes up for discussion.

⑤



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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK
*USSR: In his press conference remarks in Djakarta on 29 February Premier Khrushchev again carefully avoided directly linking his threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany to the results of the May summit conference. He stressed that a series of summit conferences would be necessary to solve international problems and expressed his expectation that the first meeting would make a good start toward this end. In an effort to appear responsive to Sukarno's appeal for Asian-African participation at future summit conferences, the joint communiqué expressed the hope that these meetings would be attended by other countries, including Asian and African states not members of alliances. In reply to a question at his press conference concerning Chinese Communist participation in a summit, Khrushchev stated that not only China but India, Indonesia, and Japan should be included.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

NO
UAR-Israel: UAR and Israeli armed forces apparently remain on partial alert, but the concern over hostilities appears to have abated somewhat on both sides. Many of the 5,000 Israeli reserves called up last week now have been released. [UAR Foreign Affairs Under Secretary Ghalib informed the American Embassy on 28 February that "certain military units had been pulled back," presumably from the Sinai. This has not as yet been confirmed by American observers.] UAR and Israeli officials are continuing to make public statements denying any aggressive intentions. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion is still scheduled to visit the US beginning on 8 March. [United Nations Secretary General Hammarskjöld has sounded out UAR and Israeli representatives in New York on the possibility of his making a personal visit to the Middle East.]

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Japan - South Korea: [Governmental and public opinion in favor of retaliatory measures against South Korea is rapidly growing] [redacted]

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25X6 N/D [redacted] Ambassador MacArthur believes that Kishi will be forced to take countermeasures against Seoul's [redacted] to avoid a storm of public protest. A top Japanese Foreign Ministry official has indicated that the Korean diplomatic mission might soon be expelled from Tokyo and all relations terminated and that subsequently trade relations would be developed with North Korea.]

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N/D Burma-India: [U Nu, who takes over again as Burmese prime minister in April, will visit New Delhi in early March, reportedly at Prime Minister Nehru's request. Nehru probably is interested in getting an informed report on the recently concluded Sino-Burmese border negotiations prior to his own meeting with Chou En-lai in April. A meeting between Nehru and U Nu, who have long been close, would also provide an opportunity to coordinate Indian-Burmese views on current international issues.] [redacted]

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25X1 N/D Cyprus: [Negotiations on Cyprus designed to remove the less controversial differences between the British and Cypriots are progressing satisfactorily. Difficulties will again be encountered when the negotiators come to the principal issue of the size of future British military bases. Archbishop Makarios has achieved new prestige among the Cypriots as a result of his tough stand on the bases thus far, but he now is coming under increased pressure from the business community to reach a settlement. London may make minor concessions on the size of the bases in order to conclude the agreement, but it insists that military needs prevent the major reductions demanded by the Cypriots.] [redacted]

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Cyprus Negotiations

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[Recently renewed talks on Cyprus between Cypriot leaders and a representative of the British Colonial Office are proceeding satisfactorily, but only the less controversial issues have thus far been discussed. An agreement apparently has been reached on training facilities outside the military base areas which will be retained by the British after independence. Questions regarding administration and finance remain, however, and no attempt has yet been made to solve the all-important question of the size of the British bases.]

[The British have publicly announced that they will continue to demand 120 square miles for the military bases and have warned privately that only minor concessions can be made. While Archbishop Makarios has never publicly altered his insistence on a maximum of 36 square miles, he has indicated that a compromise placing 80 square miles under British sovereignty--with "special facilities" in the remaining 40--would be acceptable. Cypriot officials have privately stated that an eventual compromise at about 100 square miles may be possible.]

[Meanwhile, Makarios' prestige among the Cypriots remains high because of his firm opposition to the British demands. Unemployment and economic uncertainty, however, are causing the business community on the island to urge Makarios to reach an early settlement. Greek Cypriot leaders are also aware that continued delay or failure of the negotiations could damage, if not destroy, the unity recently displayed by Greek and Turkish Cypriots.]

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